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COMMENTS
THE USE OF DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS To ENCOURAGE GUILTY
PLEAS AND JURY WAIVERS: AN APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES V.
JACKSON
State v. Forcella. 52 N.J. 263,245 A.2d 181 (1968)
Under New Jersey's homicide statute, a defendant indicted for
murder must plead either non vult, equivalent to a plea of guilty, or
not guilty.' A plea of non vult will be accepted only in the court's
discretion.2 If the defendant chooses to plead not guilty, or if the
court refuses the non vult plea, the statute requires a jury trial Only
a jury can sentence the defendant to death," and the defendant cannot
waive the jury in a murder case.5 In New Jersey, then, an accused
murderer has two alternatives: to ask the court to accept a non vult
plea, thus escaping all possibility of the death penalty, or to plead not
guilty and risk death in front of the mandatory jury.
I N J STAT ANN § 2A:13-3(1953):
In no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for murder, and if,
upon arraignment, such plea is offered, it shall be disregarded, and the plea of not guilty
entered, and a jury . . . shall try the case.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the accused from pleading non vult or nolo
contendere to the indictment, the sentence to be imposed, if such plea be accepted, shall
be either imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder
in the second degree.
The court admits that a plea of non vult is no different than a guilty plea for constitutional
purposes State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 270, 245 A.2d 181, 185 (1968).
2 State v. Belton, 48 N.J. 432, 226 A.2d 425 (1967); State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 203 A.2d
177 1964), (ert denied. 382 U.S. 990 (1966). State v. Belton outlined the court's discretionary
powers in considering the acceptance of a non vult plea. The court is not to decide guilt or
whether it would recommend life imprisonment. The question to be asked is whether the public
interest is better served by rejecting the plea and sending the case to the jury. In considering
what would serve the public interest, the trial court may consider any matter bearing upon
culpability or punishment.
3 N J CT (CRi\i.) REv R 3:7-1(a) (1958):
Trial by jury cases required to be tried by the jury shall be so tried unless the defendant,
in %%riting, Aaives a jury trial Aith the approval of the court and the consent of the state,
excepting however that in murder cases a jury trial may not be waived.
4 NAJ 'S IT \,-, § 2A: 112-4 (1953):
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree . . . shall suffer death unless the
jury shall by its verdict . . . recommend life imprisonment . ...
5 N J Cr (CRiM.) REX. R. 3:7-1(a) (1958).
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Four petitioners, two by post-conviction action and two by
interlocutory appeal, challenged the constitutionality of the statute."
They argued that the death penalty was being improperly used to
coerce them into forfeiting their fifth amendment right not to
incriminate themselves and their sixth amendment right to a jury
trial.7 HELD: The statute is constitutional. Neither fifth nor sixth
amendment rights are violated by a statute which allows a person to
plead guilty and reduce his punishment to less than death or contest
guilt and face a possible death penalty from a mandatory jury. The
challenged provisions represent a form of statutory plea bargaining.'
The Forcella court assumes that the constitutionality of the New
Jersey homicide law is determined by an analysis of United States v.
Jackson.? In Jackson, the Supreme Court struck down the death
penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act.'" Under the Federal
Rules, the defendant can plead either guilty with the permission of the
court or plead not guilty." If the defendant pleads not guilty, he may
request a jury trial, or, with the consent of the court and prosecutor,
waive a jury and be tried before the court. 2 Like the New Jersey
homicide statute, the Federal Kidnapping Act provided that only a
jury could impose the death penalty. 3 After examining the statute and
6. State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968).
7. Id. at 270-72, 245 A.2d at 184-85.
8. Id. at 279-80, 245 A.2d at 189-90.
9. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). So far as the post-conviction petitions are
concerned, see United States ex rel. Buttcher v. Yeager, 288 F. Supp, 906 (D.N.J. 1968) which
held that Jackson was not retroactive even if it did apply.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964):
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate commerce, any person who has been
unlawfully seized . . . shall be punished (I) by death if the kidnapped person has not
been liberated unharmed, and if the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
II. FED. R. CRI.1. P. II (1968):
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such
plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and consequences of the
plea . . . . The court shall not enter a judgement upon a plea of guilty unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (1968):
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial
in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government.
13. The government contested this issue in Jackson, arguing that the language of the statute
was meant as requiring a joint determination of both judge and jury that the death penalty was
suitable. The government suggested that the judge could impanel a special jury, even if a bench
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its legislative history, the Supreme Court ruled that by imposing death
onIN in the jur trial situation, Congress intended to deter defendants
from asserting their sixth amendment right to a jury trial and to
discourage defendants' assertion of their fifth amendment right not
to incriminate themselves."
1he \e\ Jerse) court deals xith the sixth amendment challenge
lirst. I \amining JcwAon. it points out that, unlike the Federal
Kidnapping Act, the New Jersey homicide statute does not make the
availabilitN of the death penalty depend upon whether a jury is
impaneled. In New Jersey, every defendant who contests guilt must
ha'e a jury trial and is therefore subject to the death penalty. The
defendant, having once decided to plead not guilty, is under no
pressure to forego his sixth amendment rights.",
The forcella court then turns to the charge that the death penalty
threat exercises an unconstitutional pressure on the defendant's fifth
amendment right not to incriminate himself. Looking at Jackson, the
court finds that the Supreme Court intertwined the fifth and sixth
amendments in its discussion of the issue. This suggests to the New
Jersey court that "not all of the members of the majority were ready
to sax that a statute which did no more than limit the penalty upon
acceptance of a guilty plea must violate the fifth amendment."";
Citing JackAson. the court states that in meeting the fifth amendment
challenge, the crucial question to be answered is whether the
potentially heavier penalty imposed on the person who contests guilt
"needlessly chill(s) the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' '1 7
Considering whether there is any "need" for the type of statutory
scheme embodied in their homicide statute, the New Jersey court finds
that its objectives are humanitarian and consistent with modern views
of penology: all defendants, no matter how repentant or rehabilitable,
are not required to risk the death penalty; those who confess their
trial as held on the issue of guilt. in order to make the defendant face the possibility of a death
sentence [he court rejected these arguments. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 580-81
(196X)
14 Id at 581; a~cord, Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (per curiam), where the
Court held malid a similar death penalty provision of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. 18
U S C 211 3(e) (1964) See also Spillers v. State, 436 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1968) which held that the
right to trial b5 jurN Aas violated under a rape statute which allowed a death penalty to be
imposed onl hN a jury
15 State 1 orcella, 52 N.J. 263, 272, 245 A.2d 181, 185 (1968).
16 Id at 272, 24i \ 2d at 15-86.
17 Id at 273, 245 \.2d at 186.
CO %MXENTS
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guilt avoid the hardship of a long jury trial; the flexibility of the
criminal process is preserved thereby increasing the court's ability to
individualize justice; and finally, allowing and encouraging guilty
pleas relieves overcrowded court dockets.18 The court points out that
these are the same considerations which justify the practice of plea
bargaining, i.e., the practice of prosecutors and courts informing
the defendant that he will receive either a lesser sentence, or be charged
with a lesser included offense in exchange for a guilty plea.' Plea
bargaining is accepted by many respected authorities. The Supreme
Court in Jackson acknowledged the cruelty of imposing like
punishment on all and the necessity for providing flexibility in the
criminal process. 0 The Forcella court, therefore, assumes that plea
18. Id. at 275, 245 A.2d at 187.
19. Id.
20. The authorities are collected by the Forcella court, Id. at 275, 245 A.2d at 187. See
generally Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ore. 1963), affd, 327 F.2d 101 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1964); State v. Taylor, 49 N.J. 440, 231 A.2d 212 (1967); Tilm
PRESIDENT'S COMiIS1ON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 11, 135 (Feb. 1967) (Though the Commission
indicates that plea bargaining may be a useful procedure, the dignity of the law, quality of
justice and protection of society are not enhanced by the practice. However, it also recognizes
that the practice serves important functions: time, effort and money can better be used
elsewhere; overcrowded dockets are relieved; trial process speed is increased; harshness of
outmoded sentencing provisions is mitigated.); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY (Tent. Draft Feb. 1967) (hereinafter cited as ABA. PLEAS OF GUILTY); D. NEWMAN.
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) (hereinafter
cited as NEWMAN); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1968); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, 112
PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). It is true, as the Forcella court points out, that the Supreme Court
finds the Federal Kidnapping Act "needlessly" chills the basic consirtui'onal rights of defendants.
The Supreme Court also lists as valid reasons for allowing guilty pleas most of the objectives the
New Jersey court attributed to its homicide statute. However, the Supreme Court listed these
objectives, not as reasons for sustaining plea bargaining-like arrangements, but in response to a
suggestion by the government that all persons accused under the Kidnapping Act be forced to a
jury trial and thus face a death sentence. The Forcella court is correct in stating that the
Supreme Court found these objectives valid. The question, however, is whether they may be
achieved without the coercion that plea bargain-like arrangements exert. The Forcella court
avoids this problem by couching the plea bargaining situation in a semantically more acceptable
form. The court admits that "no man should receive an extra penalty because he defends against
a charge." It follows this, however, by saying that:
a man who acknowledges his guilt should . . . be given consideration on that
account. . . . And wholly apart from such express agreements for leniency, it is
commonplace for sentencing judges to give weight to a guilty plea. ...
State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 275-76, 245 A.2d 181, 187 (1968).
The purpose of plea bargaining is at least mildly coercive. As its name implies, it allows the
prosecutor to "bargain" for a guilty plea. The basic issue is still the same, i.e., the
constitutionality of the plea bargaining practice. Justifying plea bargaining with the
humanitarian motive of allowing a defendant to plead guilty in a situation in which he desires to
do so without being motivated by a possibly greater pepalty only clouds the court's reasoning.
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bargaining, and with it the New Jersey homicide statute, is
constitutional.2 1
I, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLEA BARGAINING
The major premise of the court's argument is that plea bargaining,
or its statutory equivalent, is necessary for humanitarian and
pragmatic reasons. Since it is necessary, under the rationale of
Jackson, it is constitutional. An examination of the basis for this
premise is crucial in testing the soundness of the court's result.
Initially, it should be noted that guilty pleas which are improperly
induced, whether by threats or promises, are void.2 A conviction
based upon a coerced guilty plea is as invalid as a coerced
confession. 3 To assure the validity of a guilty or a non vult plea, both
the New Jersey and federal courts require a judicial determination of
its voluntariness3' It is incontrovertible that if plea bargaining
improperly induces the defendant to plead guilty, its pragmatic
justifications are overshadowed by the individual's constitutional
rights.;5 The problem is deciding when the defendant is "improperly"
induced to plead. At one extreme are physical abuses and assaults;
these are the easy cases. At the other extreme is the position that plea
bargaining is inherently coercive: that merely by requiring a person
to choose between an uncertain but possibly heavy penalty and an
assured but definitely lighter one, unconstitutional pressure is applied."
The confusion about the constitutionality of plea bargaining
21 Slate v orcella, 52 N.J. 263,275,245 ,.2d 181, 187 (1968).
22 Machribroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
23 Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Waley v. Johnston, 316
U.S 101 (1942).
24 FlI R CRIM P. 11 (1968); NJ CT. (CRIM.) REv. R. 3:5-2 (Supp. 1967). The Supreme
Court has left uncertain how much of the federal law regarding voluntary pleas is applicable to
the state,
25 See generally Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968); Rogers v.
Wainwright. 394 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Holman, 356 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1966);
Euziere v United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Garrett v. Russell,
281 I Supp 104 fE D Pa. 1968); United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp.
506 (E D N Y 1967): United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 22 RUT. L. REV. 167 (1967).
26. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). Though concerned explicitly with
judicial participation in the plea bargaining process, the Michigan Court of Appeals makes a
long and telling critique of plea bargaining in general and the ABA standards in particular.
People v Earegood, 12 Mich. App. 256, 162 N.E.2d 802 (1968). The court states:
the standards state it is proper for a trial judge to grant sentence concessions to
CO MMENTS
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stems from the decision in Shelton v. United States."7 In Shelton, the
petitioner moved to set aside his conviction on the ground that his
plea of guilty was involuntary. He alleged that government counsel
induced him to plead guilty with promises of leniency. The circuit
court held that the trial court, before accepting the plea, did not
ascertain whether the plea was voluntary and not induced by such
promises. The court stated that there was no doubt that the defendant
pleaded guilty in reliance on the promises. The conviction was set
aside and the plea vacated.
The court, sitting en bane, reversed and held the plea voluntary.
The proper test of voluntariness, it said, is whether the plea is entered
by one fully aware of the consequences and value of commitments.
Unless the plea is induced by threats, misrepresentations or improper
promises, it must stand."5 The dissent contended that the proper
inquiry should be whether the plea of guilty is made under such
circumstances that it constitutes reliable and trustworthy evidence of
the defendant's guilt."5
When the United States Supreme Court was presented with the
problem, the Solicitor General conceded that the plea of guilty may
have been improperly obtained. The Fifth Circuit was reversed in a
per curianz decision."' That court since has declared that it does not
consider the dissent to be the law.'" It is unclear whether the Supreme
Court reversed Shelton because of the trial judge's failure to comply
with the federal procedural rules or because the court thought that a
plea induced by a promised sentence is invalid.-"
those who plead guilty so long as the judge himself does not participate in the
bargaining ...
The commentary accompanying the standards takes no notice of either the relatively
few supportive or the greater number of contrary judicial statements. . .. but rather
relies on its own exegesis. . . (T)he ABA guilty pleas standard 1.8... offers a truly
minimum standard.
Id. at 266, 162 N.E.2d at 808-09.
27. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), rev'd en bane. 246 I-.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd per curiain, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). Compare Allen v. State. 118 Ga. App. 354. 163
S.E.2d 839 (1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1305 (1969). But see, McCarthy v. United States, 89
S. Ct. 1166 (1969); State v. Alford. 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968). appealgranted 89 S.
Ct. 1306 (1969).
28. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 57,. 572 (5th Cir. 1957). eiting Shelton v. United
States. 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion. 3-judge panel).
29. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571. 579 (5th Cir. 1957).
30. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam). See generally -Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301. 216 A.2d 586 (1966).
31. Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958).
32. ABA. PLEAS OF GUILTY at 64.
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Not%%ithstanding Shelion and its possible implications, plea
bargaining ik gencrall accepted.; In fact, plea bargaining has been
openly advocated when accompanied by the proper safeguards.
31
Questionable practices usually result from secret and hurried
bargaining between prosecutor and defense counsel. Inherent in this
type of situation are constitutional infirmities, for the defendant may
be tricked or fail to understand precisely the disposition agreement.
To counter this potential for the violation of constitutional rights, it
has been urged that plea agreements be reached openly, that the
defendant be kept fully informed and that the ultimate decision be his
alone.: The American Bar Association, for example, recommends
that a court should not accept a guilty or nolo contendere plea unless
it actually determines that the plea is voluntary 6 This requires a
genuine effort by the trial judge to insure that the defendant is
accorded his constitutional safeguards. The inquiry should reveal if
any plea agreement was reached and, if so, upon exactly what terms.
3 7
When used in this manner, plea bargaining serves what at least some
courts are willing to accept as a valid purpose. For example, a crime
is rarely committed in precisely the same way and by identical
personalities. Therefore, charge reductions help serve to individualize
criminal justice." Additionally, trial judges are normally in a better
position than the legislature to determine what type of sentence should
be imposed on a particular individual. 9 Not only should the penalty
fit the crime but it should also fit the individual defendant.
II. STATUTORY PLEA BARGAINING
New Jersey's homicide statute, in effect, assumes the role of a
prosecutor who offers a sentence reduction in exchange for a plea of
non vuli. If the defendant decides to plead not guilty, he still
maintains his fifth- and sixth amendment rights. To those who
33 ', , ralli ,\BA, PLEA', OF GLILTN and NE\XAN. I-or a discussion of the opposite
position, see People v. Earegood. 12 Mich. App. 256, 162 N.E.2d 802 (1968) and cases
collected
34 ,eiwrali ABA. PLEA, OF GUILT. NiW\IA\, THIE PRE-SIDI\T'S CoMMissIoN oN LAW
-Ni-ORCI ME"T \ND \DIINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
35 See authorities cited in note 34, supra.
36 \B,\ Pi I\s o GILTY § 1.5.
37 See Id , 1.5, NEW. MAN at 27.
38 See NEWMAN at 112. Seealso ABA, PLEAS OF GUILTY.
39 See NE'A.N. See also ABA, PLEAS OF GUILTY.
CO \INII NTS
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advocate openly conducted plea bargaining, the New Jersey statute
must serve as a model. There can be nothing more open than a statute
which offers the same "bargaining" arrangement to each defendant.
One problem with covert plea bargaining is that there is a greater
chance for disparity of sentencing and plea agreements. Conversely, a
statutory form of implicit plea bargaining avoids the prejudices of
covert arrangements. This is not to say that New Jersey's type of
statute does not lend itself to disparate offers from the prosecution. It
does, however, assure that all defendants are treated more equally
because each has the opportunity to select a route most likely to avoid
death. Because the so-called implied bargain offer is framed in
statutory form, there is no adequate reason to invalidate it if non-
statutory and otherwise proper plea bargaining is judicially acceptable.
In view of its general acceptance and usefulness, it is submitted that
the Forcella court is at least arguably correct in concluding that plea
bargaining is necessary. If the New Jersey bourt read Jackson
correctly, the necessity for the practice sustains its constitutionality.
There is, however, an intrinsic difficulty in the process by which the
Forcella court separates the sixth amendment jury trial issue from
the fifth amendment right-to-contest issue and then narrows the
latter to the question of the necessity for plea bargaining type
arrangements. This logical gap weakens the holding of the court, and
blurs the contrast between the Federal Kidnapping Act and the New
Jersey homicide statute.
The Forcella court recognizes that the Supreme Court treated the
fifth and sixth amendment issues concurrently in Jackson." It,
however, departs from Jackson and decides them separately. It
sustains the homicide statute against the sixth amendment attack by
stating that all defendants, once they elect to contest guilt, must have
a jury trial.4' This begs the question: though the defendant might
want'the issue of his guilt determined by a jury, as he is so entitled
under the sixth amendment, might not the threat of the death penalty
keep him from challenging his guilt at all? The defendant cannot assert
his sixth amendment right to a jury trial without also exercising his
fifth amendment right to contest guilt. Jackson's joint treatment of
the fifth and sixth amendment issues is understandable only if it is
assumed that the Supreme Court thought that part and parcel of the
40. State v. Forcella', 52 N.J. 263, 272, 245 A.2d 181, 185 (1968).
41. Id. at 272, 245 A.2d at 185.
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fifth amendment right to challenge an accusation of guilt is the right
under the sixth amendment to have that challenge heard by a jury'-2
CONCLUSION
Only by formulating the Jackson holding. as the Supreme Court
did, in terms of both fifth and sixth amendment rights, can plea
bargaining be sustained as constitutional.13 It may be argued, if this
rationale is correct, that the Supreme Court struck down the penalty
portion of the Federal Kidnapping Act because it separated the fifth
amendment right to contest guilt from the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial. Jackson does not decide whether both may be affected
together, as they are in the plea bargaining situation, by the offer of a
lower sentence. The Supreme Court does decide that the state cannot
coerce the defendant into asserting only part of his constitutional
rights. Under this reading of Jackson, it is not only the right to
contest that an individual asserts if he refuses to admit his guilt and
demands a trial. The fifth amendment right to contest guilt must be
read to include the sixth amendment right to a jury."
Such a reading of Jackson does not fault the determination of the
Forcella court, but it more clearly defines the basic question that must
be answered before the statute can be constitutionally sustained. Does
Jackson forbid all coercion which might create an incentive for a
defendant contemplating the surrendering of his constitutional rights,
42 Under the -ederal Kidnapping Act, a defendant still could challenge his guilt and avoid
the pOsibilit of a death sentence by waiving a jury and agreeing to a bench trial. As the
Forcela court points out, this alone gives the Supreme Court cause to strike the penalty
provision as a iolation of the sixth amendment. Id. at 269, 245 A.2d at 184. The Supreme
Court states that not only is the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury trial "deterred"
but his fifth amendment right not to plead guilty is "discouraged." Apparently, the Forcella
court "as unable to decide how the fifth amendment rights of the defendant would be
discouraged bN the Federal Kidnapping Act provisions. Id. at 273, 245 A.2d at 186. It is
submitted that the reason the Jackson court thought the defendant's fifth amendment rights
were discouraged is that his assertion of his right not to plead guilty-his right to trial-was
incomplete if he was deterred from requesting a jury. The coercion applied by the death penalty
deters the defendant from asserting his sixth amendment rights and this, by itself, discourages
him Ironi exercising his filth amendment rights.
43 A& hat is needless in Jackson, and therefore unconstitutional, is making the penalty depend
upon Awhether the defendant contests his guilt before a jury or judge. But, contrary to what the
Forndla court asserts, "-Ahen the focus is upon the fifth amendment (rather than the sixth)
other values" do not come into play. Jackson holds that the rights niust be considered
together
44 This is consistent A ith the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the right to jury trial as
part of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
CO MMENTS
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or does necessity, such as that upon which plea bargaining is founded,
override the possibility of minor infringements to which such coercion
gives rise? This is a question to which the Forcella court properly
addressed itself. It should not, however, be clouded by subtle
distinctions between the constitutional rights assured by the fifth and
sixth amendments.
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